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IN THE· SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
L. BrRT BIGLER and HERBERT 
K. SLOAXE, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
R~\.Y P. GREENWOOD, GEORGE W. 
MORGAN and LAWRENCE A. 
JOXES, as Commissioners of Salt 
Lake . County, and as Directors of 
the .Salt Lake City Suburban Sew~r Case No. 7915 
District, 
Defendants, 
and 
~ALT LAKE COUNTY SUBURBAN 
LJIPROYEJIENT ASSOCIATION, 
IXC., a corporation, 
Involuntary Party Plaintiff. 
BRIEF OF JXYOLrNTARY PARTY PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT 
The Salt Lake County Suburban Improvement Asso-
ciation, Inc. was joined as an involuntary party plaintiff, 
by the plaintiff in this case. 
The Association elected to file ·a separate petition 
and brief in this cause in order that the position of thou-
sands of the residents affected by the sewer project 
would be before the court. It will be our contention that 
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not only was the act under which the Commission pro-
ceeded unconstitutional, and that the acts of the Commis-
sion thereunder were arbitrary, capricious and illegal 
but that, in addition thereto, the legislature of this State 
has enacted legislation de~igned specifically for the cre-
ation and financing of projects of the magnitude and 
character involved in this case. 
It is our earnest belief that a sewer project in the 
area concerned should be constructed at the earliest 
possible date. It is the Association's conviction, how-
ever, that the need for a sewer is not so great that con-
stitutional rights should be sacrificed and that an ill-
conceived, patch work, method of financing under an out-
mod~d act should be adopted. We have endeavored to 
raise and discuss every issue bearing on this question 
so that this Court may render a decision that will aid ~~,; 
all interested parties and permit additional legislation ~ 
to be introduced at the 1953 session, if needed. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
Apparently there is no dispute between the parties 
as to questions of fact. The parties do disagree, we be-
lieve, as to the relevance and legality of certain ordi- q 
nances, resolutions, and contracts. Because the record 
consists only of ordinances, resolutions, protests, and a 
stipulation, rather than a transcript, and because in the 
course of the brief, reference will be made to certain of ,. 
these documents, we are outlining in chronological order 
the steps followed by the defendants. 
On May 18, 1942, the Board of Commissioners of 
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Salt Lake County (hereinafter designated "Commis-
sion") adopted an ordinance regulating and controlling 
all public or private sewers in the County. (Ex. A) Un-
der the tenus of tllis ordinance, the owner of any im-
provenlent within ~00 feet of a n1ain or lateral sewer line 
must connect up with the sewer line or be guilty of mis-
demeanor. A connection fee of $150.00 was imposed. 
Under Section 17 of the ordinance, moneys paid for con-
nection fees or otherwise on said sewer system was to be 
placed in a general fund and the expenses of maintenance 
and operation were to be paid by the County out of the 
general fund. 
On illay 16, 1951, this ordinance was amended by 
providing that in lieu of the $150.00 connection fee, the 
connection fee of $100.00 per connection would be charg-
ed if applied for by an owner of ten or more residences. 
(Ex. N) 
On September 9, 1946, the Commission adopted a 
resolution that it enter an order creating the special im-
provement district and designated the boundaries thereof. 
(Ex. B) The order was entered on the same date and . 
the district was created under the authority of Title 19 
Chapter 6A U.C.A. 1943. (Ex. C) 
On January 20, 194 7, the Commission accepted an 
offer to purchase $2,750,000.00 (or such le·sser amount 
as recommended by the engineer) of revenue bonds of 
the Board of County Commissioners. (Ex. D) Under 
the terms of the contract, sufficient number of signed 
service applications accompanied by deposits of $50.00 
per application would have to be secured, together with a 
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requirement of an additional connection charge of $99.00 '' 
in cash of $120.00 in deferred payments as to applications 
filed prior to letting of the construction contract; there-
after connection charge was to be $140.00 in cash; the 
maximum intere·st cost was not to exceed 31;4% ; it was 
estimated that it would be possrble to retire the bonds in 
about 11 years; the minimum charge was to be $2.00 per 
month. 
On March 18, 1947, a Resolution (Ex. U) was adopt-
ed formally creating the district in order to provide for 
the installation of a complete system and plant within 
the boundaries of the district. Section 4 (Pg. 4, Ex. U) 
of said resolution provides in part as follows: 
"*** It is contemplated that the charges to be 
made to the users of the system will constitute 
liens against the property in said district enforce-
able in the event of a default in the payment of 
such charges, based either upon the service ap-
plication agree1nents to be signed by the owner 
of said property or otherwise." ·~ 
The resolution was, therefore, orde~ed to be filed 
for recording to give notice of such lien. Thereafter, an 
ordinance was adopted making it unlawful to construct, 
or for the owner or any other person to occupy any prop-
erty for residential, commercial, or industrial use within 
200 feet of any street, etc., in which 'a public sewer is then 
in existence and making it further unlawful for any 
owner not to connect with the public sewer to be built 
after notice is given that the public sewer is to receive 
connections. A violator of this ordinance is guilty of 
misdemeanor punishable with a fine not excee·ding $299.-
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OO·or by an imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or·by 
both fine and imprisonment. (Pg. 9, Ex. U) 
N" ext on the same date the Commission adopted what 
might be ter1ned the bond resolution. The title of this 
resolution reads as follows: 
.. A resolution providing for the acquisition of 
a sanitary sewer systen1 and treatment and dis-
posal plant for the use of the inhabitants of the 
area in Salt Lak:e County known as 'Salt Lake 
Suburban Sanitary District' : providing for the 
issuance of the bonds of Salt Lake County' payable 
frmn the revenue to be derived from the operation 
of said sewer systen1: entering into certain agree-
lnents and making certain provisions for th~ se-
curity and pay1nent of su.ch bond.s·::confir:rnlli.g the 
sale and provide for the delivery of such bonds 
and entering into collateral agreements and pro-
visions in coimection with the foregoing." 
The resolution in addition to ·adopting the prom-
sions required in the agreement with the fiscal agents and 
purchaser of the bonds provided for the following: 
The cost of the portion of the system to be initially 
constructed, including all incidental expenses, was esti-
mated to be not in excess of $2,750,000.00 (page 11). The 
guaranty fund should never exceed 10% of the principal 
amount. The original bond issue was to be $1,400~000.00 
becoming due $50,.000.00 .each year for 28 years. The 
~chedule of rates, initial service charge, and additional 
payments is set forth on Page 29. The ordinance provid-
ing for the. discontinuance of privy vaults, septic tanks, 
and cesspools and for connecting to public sewers, supra, 
was to be maintained in force by the County; The Gom-
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mission was to require any owner delinquent for 
more than six months in the payment of the charges to 
cease to dispose all waste from his premises, and in 
order to enforce this provision, the Commission was to 
give notice to any public or private board supplying 
water to or selling water to the premise to cease supply-
ing water, and if any public or private corporation did 
not cease supplying water to the premises the Commission 
shall be entitled to enter upon such premises and it shall 
through an agent of employe, shut off the supply water o.f 
such premises ; the bonds were to be sold to Lauren W. 
Gibbs at set price as will result in an interest cost not in 
excess of 31,4 o/o per annum. 
On April 2, 1947, resolution (Ex. E) was adopted 
appointing Caldwell, Richards, and Sorenson, as Con-
sulting Engineers, and Koebig and Koebig as Associates 
on the design and construction of the project. 
On May 16, 1947, a resolution was adopted appoint-
ing C. Earl Alsop, L. Burt Bigler, and Horace A. Soren-
son as members of the Advisory Committee. (Ex. G) 
On June 30, 1947, a resolution was adopted (Ex. H) 
providing that in the event that it is determined that the 
sewer was not to be constructed under the resolution and 
ordinance theretofore adopted, and that the project be 
abandoned, Trustee was to return all payments made by 
the owners. 
On September 29, 194 7 the Commission resolved to 
increase to $3,250,000.00 the maximum amount of bonds 
which may be required to be purchased by the Fiscal 
Agent. 
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On January 9, 1948, (Ex. J) Commission by resolu-
tion accepted and agreed to the proposal of the pur-
chasing, fiscal agent to extend the time for the delivery 
of the bonds, pro,iding that the interest cost be increased 
frmn 3.~3<;;(, to 3.72jc. 
On February 16, 19-±S (Ex. I() according to the min-
utes of Conunission, the Commission questioned whether 
it was feasible to proceed with the project. 
On ~\.pril5, 1948, at a 1neeting attended by the Board 
of Commissioners, the County Attorney, Mr. Edward M. 
~Iorrissey and his Chief Deputy, Elliot W. Evans, a 
resolution was submitted by ilir. Evans which was there-
after adopted by the Commission. (Ex. L) The Commis-
sion in its preamble stated, "All bids for the construction 
of said sewer system has been rejected as being e.xces-
sive and numerous objections to the construction of the 
proposed sewer systen1 at this time and under the pro-
posed method of finance thereof have been m·ade to and 
received by the Board of County Commissioners and 
the Board of County Commissioners deem in (sic) in-
advisable under present conditions to proceed with the 
construction of the sewer system in said Salt Lake 
County Suburban Sanitary District." and further, "many 
of said prospective users who have made payment of 
said initial payments are now requesting and demand 
the return of said initial payment." Thereupon it duly re-
solved to abandon the proposed acquisition of sewer sys-
tem as provided in the resolution of March 18, 194 7 and 
rescinded said resolution. The trustee was authorized and 
directed to return all initial payments. 
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Nothing further was. done. by the Commission in 
regard to this project for the next four years except to 
return to the fiscal agent a deposit of $20,000.00. 
On March 7, 1952, a letter dated January 31, 1952 
of Robert E. Schweser was accepted by reso~ution of 
the Board of County Commissioners. (Ex. 0) 
Under the terms of this contract, it was recognized 
that the interest of Lauren W. Gibbs in a previous con-
tract had been sold and assigned to Wacob-Bender Cor~ 
poration and Robert E. Schweser Company. Instead of 
an outright sale, the assignees were to act as Fiscal 
Agent and agreed: "5-Fo,r such Revenue Bonds as may 
be issued to pay for the construction of the 0omplete 
sewer facilities under the present district and which meet 
the above requirements, we guarantee to find a buyer 
at a price interest rate and maturity as approved as to 
legality by the aforesaid bond attorneys and by the 
engineer as to feasibility." 
On March 10, 1952, (Ex. P), there was a recommend-
ation that the Commission pass a resolution instructing 
the Engineer to proceed with a· study of new construc-
tion in the district for the purpose of bringing the ori-
ginal plans up to date. Estimates of construction costs 
were to be prepared together with final plans and specifi-
cations. 
On June 30, 1952, First Security Bank of Utah was 
appointed depository. (Ex. Q) 
The minutes of August 25, 1952-(Ex. R) summarize 
the hearing held on the protest of Harrison Brothers. As 
is indicated "The financing of the proposed sewer was 
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discussed.n The Chairman stated "all sound suggestions 
would be considered and incorporated into the plan 
wherever possible." 
On Septen1ber 12, 1952, (Ex. T), the Commission ap-
proved the letter addressed to the Engineer which di-
rected then1 to proceed at once to advertise for bids for 
the construction of the County Sewer. The advertising· 
was to start not later than September 19, so that the bids 
could be opened on October 20, 1952. 
On October 6, 1952, (Ex. Y) a resolution was passed 
repealing the resolution adopted on April 5, 1948, res-
cinding certain proceedings pertaining to Salt Lake Sub-
urban Sanitary District. The resolution reads as fol-
lows: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the 
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, that said resolution of April 5, 
1948 purporting to rescind the proceedings there-
tofore adopted as set forth in the preamble here-
tofore is hereby declared to have been adopted by 
mistake and is hereby expressly repealed, res-
cinded, and held for naught and said proceedings 
of ~larch 18, 194:7 are hereby approved, ratified, 
and declared to be now and to before since March 
18, 194 7 in full force and exact in all respects as 
though said resolution of April 5, 1948 had never 
· been adopted." 
.On the same date a resolution (Ex. W) was adopted 
amending the resolution of March 18, 1947. (Ex. U) 
The material amendments will be discussed under 
the applicable section of our argument. 
Thereafter on the same date a further resolution 
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(Ex. X) was adopted whose title is as follows : 
"A resolution providing for the issuance of 
$3,850,000 Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer Bonds 
Series 1952, payable from the operation of a sani~ 
tary sewer system and treatment disposal plant in 
and adjacent to Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dis-
trict; entering into certain agreements and mak-
ing certain provisions for the security and pay-
ment of such honds and providing for the sale and 
delivery thereof." 
The material sections of this resolution will also be 
discussed under the applicable section of our argument. 
It is assumed that all further action by the Com-
mission has been stayed since the entry of this Court's 
order on October 8, 1952. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
FOR THE COMMISSION'S ACTS. 
POINT 2. THE STATUTES AND DEFENDANTS' PRO-
CEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
POINT 3. THE COMMISSION'S ACTS ARE ILLEGAL, 
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS. 
POINT 4. THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OCTOBER 6, 
1952 ARE ILLEGAL, VOID, AND BEYOND THE POWER OF 
THE COMMISSION. 
.ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
FOR THE ACTS OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMIS-
SIONERS. 
The proposed project and the proposed financing 
are not within the express limitations contained in Title 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19, Chapter 6a, Section ~. Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
The literal or granunatical rneaning of the language 
employed by the Legislature in Section 8 of Chapter 6a 
of Title 19, lT.C.A .• 1943, leaYe~ little roon1 for specula-
tion or debate concerning the legislative intent. In the 
preceding seetion~ of Chapter 6a, supra, the Legislature 
has described the projects and special improvement dis-
tricts that boards of county comnrissioners rnay create 
and operate and it has prescribed the methods by which 
the cost of such projects or special improvements may be 
provided. The methods of financing in such preceding 
sections are expressly linrited to (i) the levying of assess-
ments against the property benefited, or (ii) the impos-
ing of fees, tolls, rents or other charges for the use of 
the improvements, or (iii) both. No general authority 
is conferred upon such boards to enter into any contracts 
to provide funds with which to finance such projects or 
special improvements or to pledge or hypothecate reve-
nues in connection therewith. Then comes Section 8 
which does confer a special or limited authority to bor-
row funds, to enter into contracts, to issue securities, and 
to pledge or hypothecate revenues as security for repay-
ment of borrowed funds. This authority is expressly 
limited to matters "in connection" with the financing of 
such of said projects and special improvements (those 
previously described in Chapter 6a) "as may be approp-
priate and possible under the laws of the United States 
relating thereto." The phrase "laws of the United 
States" has only one meaning and that is "Acts of Con-
gress." See cases cited in Words and Phrases, Perman-
11 
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ent Edition,. Volume 24, . pages. 440-441,. and in 1952 
pocke~ supplement the·reto, page 142. There can be no 
question that the power conferred under Section 8, supra, 
is limited 'by the plain language of the statute to the fi-
nancing of such projects as may be appropriate and pos-
sible under Acts of the Congress of the United States. 
It is only "in co'YIII'bection" with such projects that the 
Board of County Commissioners -of any county is 
authorized to enter into contracts with the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation of the United States or with 
any other private or public agency, person, corporation 
or individual, for the purpose of providing funds with 
which to finance a proposed project or special improve-
ment. It is only "in connection" with the financing of 
such projects and special improvements as may be ap-
propriate and possible under Acts of the Congress of .the 
United States that the Board of County Commissioners 
of any county is authorized to issue securities and pledge . 
or hypothecate revenues for the payment of the princi-
pal and interest thereof. 
The question immediately arises, of course, whether 
a literal construction ·of the language employed by the 
Legislature in Section 8 is a reasonable construction, that 
is, whether such literal construction is in harmony with 
the general purposes of the statute, and whether there 
were in existence at the time of its enactment any "laws 
of the United States," (Acts of Congress), relating to 
projects and special improvements of the type generally 
authorized by the chapter and which might require the 
borrowing -of funds and the pledging or hypothecation 
12 
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of revenues. It is submitted that there was in existence 
at least one Art of CongTe~~, enacted, during the ad-
ministration .of President Hoover, which related to the 
financing of projects and special in1proven1ents of the 
type conteinpla.ted by SectionS, supra. That was the "Re-
construction Finance Corporation Act and Emergency 
Relief and Construction Act of 193:2," Title 15, U.S. Code, 
Chapter 14, Section 605 (b), popularly referred to as the 
"E1nergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932." (Note 
July :21, 1932, C. 520, Section 201, 4 7 Stat. 711 et seq.) 
Section 605(b), supra, provided in part as follows: 
"Section 605(b). Same; additional loans au-
thorized - (a) Self-liquidating projects; convict 
labor 
"The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is 
authorized and empowered. 
"(1) To make loans to, or contracts with, 
States, municipalities, and political subdivisions 
of states, public agencies of States, of municipali-
ties, and of partial subdivjsions of States, public 
corporations,. boards and commissions, and public 
municipal instrumentalities of one or more States, 
to aid in financing projects authorized under Fed-
eral, State or municipal law which are self-1iqui-
dating in charac~er, such loans or contracts to 
be made through the purchase of their s-ecurities, 
or otherwise, and for such purpose the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation is authorized to 
bid for such securities. 
* * * 
"(6) * * * 
"For the purposes of this subsection a project 
shall be deemed to be self-liquidating if such 
13 
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, 
project will be made self-supporting and financi-
ally solvent and if the construction cost thereof 
will be returned within a reasonable period by 
means of tolls, fees, rents or other charges, or by 
such other means (other than by taxation) as 
may be prescribed by the statutes which provide 
for the project, * * *" 
The foregoing provisions were construed in the case 
of Public Market Company of Portland v. City of Port-
land (1942), 130 P. 2nd 624, 171 Or. 522, amplified on 
rehearing, 138 P. 2nd 916, 171 Or. 522. The Oregon 
Court, in the latter opinion, co~ented as follows: 
"The Emergency Relief and Construction Act 
of 1932 granted to it (the RFC) power to make 
loans only to aid in financing projects, such as 
a municipal market, 'which are self-liquidating 
in character,' 15 U.'S.C.A. 605b (a) (3). By para-
graph number ( 6) of that section the project 'shall 
be deemed to be self-liquidating if such project 
will be made self-supporting and financially sol-
vent and if the construction cost thereof will be 
returned within a reasonable period by means of 
tolls, fees, rents, or other charges, or by such 
other mearis (other than by taxation) as may be 
prescribed by the statutes which provide for the 
project * * :;:,, Although the statute does not pre-
clude the corporation from taking the additional 
security of a general mbicipal obligation, if the 
project is otherwise eligible as a self-liquidating 
one (see Circular No. 3 of the RFC, Information 
for Prospective Applicants for Loans for 'Self-
Liquidating' Projects under the Emergency Re-
lief and Construction Act of 1932, February, 
1933) still it is o'bvious that the purpose of the 
act ~as to relieve unemployment by financing 
self-liquidating projects during a period of de-
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pression when, a8 we judicially know, municipal 
corporations and other public bodies were hard 
put to find ta..."\: money8 sufficient to meet even the 
ordinary expense8 of governinent." 
Section 605 (b), supra, was repeated by Act June 30, 
19±7, C. 166, Title II 206 (a) (e), G1 Stat. 208. 
~\ mere reading of Section· 8 of Chapter 6a, supra, 
with its reference to the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration, to "self-liquidating projects," etc., together with 
Section 605 (b) of the Emergency Relief and Construc--
tion Act of 193:2, supra, can lead to no other conclusion 
than that the "Gtah Legislature intended by Section 8 to 
enable boards of county commissioners to take advantage 
of the opportunity to obtain loan funds from the Re-
construction Finance Corporation or similar Federal 
lending and that the powers conferred were carefully 
limited to those necessary for the accomplishment of that 
purpose and that purpose alone. 
If anything further is required to convince the Court 
that Section 8 of Chapter 6a, supra, was intended by the 
Legislature to apply only to such projects and special 
improvements as might be financed under laws of the 
r nited States relating thereto, a review of the legislative 
history of the enactment of Chapter 6a, supra, and par-
ticularly of Section 8 thereof, as revealed by House 
Journal, Special and 20th Sessions of the Legislature 
of the State of Utah, 1933, should suffice. The measure 
was introduced in the Utah Legislature on February 13, 
1933, as House Bill101. As originally introduced, House 
Bill 101 did not contain the provisions which appear in 
15 
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Section 8 · nor was there any reference te the subject 
·matter of Section 8 in the title of the bill as originally 
introduced. On the day of introduction it was read the 
first time and referred to the Committee on Irrigation, 
which committee, after consideration of the measure 
' reported it favorably on February 25, 1933, with amend-
ments. One of the amendments added the words in the 
title of the bill after the word "both" and added at the 
end of the bill the present Section 8 of Chapter 6a, supra. 
It will be noted from the comment of the Oregon Court 
in Public Market Company of Portland v. City of Port-
land, supra, quoted above, that reference was made there-
in to circular No. 3 of the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration, entitled "Information for Prospective Appli-
cants for Loans for 'Self-liquidating Projects under the 
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932," and 
that such circular was issued in February of 1933. Even 
though the legislative history of the act under considera-
tion is not complete, there being no report of the proceed-
ings of the Committee on Irrigation or of the reasons 
which prompted the addition of the present Section 8 
or of debate on the measure, it may reasonably be as-
sumed that the addition of the enabling provision was 
prompted by the receipt, in February of 1933 and after 
the introduction of the bill, of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation's Circular No. 3, refeTred to above, or of 
other publicity concerning the availability of loans to 
counties and other State political subdivisions under the 
provisions of the Emergency Relief and Construction 
Act of 1932. 
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It is clear fron1 the foregoing that Section H of 
Chapler t)a. supra, conferred no authority whatsoever 
upon any board of county ('onunissioners to enter into 
any contraets or to issue any seeurities or to hypothe-
cate or pledge any reYennes, other than "in connection" 
with projects or special in1prove1nents for which financ-
ing n1ight be obtained through one of the authorized 
agencies of the Federal government, particularly the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The authorization 
provided therein for the entering into contracts with 
. "any other priYa te or public agency, person, corporation, 
or individual," clearly is restricted to such contracts as 
might be necessary to the creation and operation of proj- . 
ects and special improvements "appropriate and possible 
under the laws of the L nited States relating thereto." 
It is common knowledge, of course, that Federal aid in 
the form of financing through the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation, or similar agencies, is seldom 100% 
financing but usually involves the financing of a part 
of the cost by the borrower through other means. More-
over, it will be noted from the provisions of Section 605 
(b) of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 
1932, supra, that the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion was authorized thereby to make loans or contracts 
to aid in financing local projects through the purchase 
of the securities of the political subdivision and was 
authorized to bid for such securities. This, of course, 
envisione~ · something other than direct loans and would 
entail the purchase of securities which involved con-
tracts between the borrower and other persons, corpo-
17 
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rations, or individuals. The fact is inescapable, however, 
that the authorization contained in Section 8 of Chapter 
6a, supra, for the entering into contracts with any other 
person, corporation, or individual, was expressly limited 
to such contracts as were "in connection" with such 
projects and special improvements as were "appropriate 
and possible under the laws of the United States relat-
ing thereto." 
It should be here noted that the special and limited 
character of the authorization contained in Section 8, 
supra, furnishes the only plausible explanation of the 
failure of the legislature to make provision therein for 
the normal safeguards of the public interest, such as 
publication of notice, opportunity for protest, election on 
issuance of bonds, etc., which are contained in acts pro-
viding for the acquisition of improvements by special 
improvement districts and the issuance of bonds in pay-
ment therefor. Section 8, supra, contemplated nothing 
more than the obtaining of such Federal assistance as 
might be available, and it carefully restricted the author-
ity granted to that which was necessary to enable bo:ards 
of county commissioners to obtain such assistance. The 
Court may take judicial notice of the fact that this legis-
lation came in the very depth of the economic depression 
that swept the country in the early thirties; that like the 
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, supra, 
which it complemented, its primary purpose was to 
relieve unemployment by financing self-liquidating proj-
ects during a period when local governmental units could 
scarcely meet their ordinary expenses of government, 
18 
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and when the Federal govern1nen t was virtually the only 
souree of financial aid for public. works. Aid and reHef 
were needed with a n1ini.J.nun1 of delay, and the ordinary 
safeguards had to be foregone to enable municipalities 
to obtain the assistanee pr01nptly. But it is inconceivable 
that the legislature intended that such safeguards should 
be waived for all purposes and for all tune. Indeed, when 
the Roosevelt Adnrinistra.tion can1e into power and pro-
ceeded to enact other relief legislation providing for 
grants in aid and loans to States and political sub-
division of states, the l'tah legislature met in special 
session and provided further implemental legislation 
to enable counties, cities, towns, and any improvement 
districts · to obtain financial aid from Federal sources, 
particularly under the so-called National Industrial Re-
covery Act and from the Federal E1nergency Adminis-
tration of Public \V orks. See Laws of Utah, 1933, Second 
Special Session, Chapter 22, effective August 8, 1933, 
Title 76A, Chapter 2, Section 1, et seq., and Laws 1933, 
Second Special Session, Chapter 23, effective July 26, 
1933, Title 76A, Chapter 2, Section 24, et seq., These en-
actments were more comprehensive than Title 19, Chap-
ter 6a, Section 8, supra, and supplemented the earlier 
provision which may be said to have had only a brief per-
iod of act~al applicability since it was directed to the 
obtaining of relief under the Emergency :Relief and Con-
struction Act of 1932, supra, the functions of which 
were superseded by those provided under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and similar enactments of the 
new national administration which came into power in 
~[arch of 1933. 
19 
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. . IF. TITLE 19, . QltAPTER -Sa, SECTION 8,. UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1943,. AS AMENDED,. WAS INTENDED BY 
THE 1933 LEGISLATURE TO APPLY TO SEWER PROJ-
ECTS, AND FINANCING, OF THE TYPE HERE IN CON-
TROVERSY, THEN SUCH SECTION MUST BE HELD TO 
HAVE BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION BY SUBSE-
QUENT ENACTMENTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
DEALING COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THE SAME SUB-
JECT MATTER. 
If it is conceded, arguendo,. that Section 8, supra, 
does authorize conventional revenue bond financing in 
connection with sewer projects such -as that contemplated 
by the proposal here in controversy, it is submitted that 
such statutory authority has been superseded by subse-
quent enactments of the Utah legislature and must be 
considered to have_ been repealed by implication to the 
extent that it had application to the financing of the ac-
quisition, construction, etc., of sewer systems. 
The first subsequent legislation to be considered 
is Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947, Title 19, Chapter 
5a, Sections 1 to 23, inclusive, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, as amended, which was repealed by Chapter 24, 
Laws of Utah, 1949, Title 19, Chapter 5a, Sections 24 to 
40, inclusive. A review of the title to this measure is 
sufficient to reveal that it was an attempt to deal com-
prehensively with the important matter of the creation 
and ope·ration of "sewerage improvement districts" and 
the financing of the acquisition and construction of 
sewage facilities. This enactment, it will be noted, did 
attempt to provide the safeguards of the public interest, 
that is, the due process provisions for notice, public hear-
ing, bond elections, etc., which are normally contained 
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in such statutes. Apparently, however, the provisions 
were deemed inadequate, beeause the 1949 legislature ex-
pressly repealed then1 and enacted in their stead an 
even n1ore con1prehensiYe statute with greater attention 
to constitutional rights and denwcratic procedures. Then 
in El51, by Chapter :2-!, Laws of the State of Utah, 1951, 
the 1949 enactment was further an1ended and improved, 
with even greater en1phasis upon protection of the prop-
erty owners' rights. 
It is submitted that there is an irreconcilable con-
flict between the provisions of Section 8, Chapter 6a, 
Title 19, supra, and those parts of the subsequent enact-
ments hereinbefore cited, which relate to the financing 
of the construction and acquisition of sewer and sewage 
facilities. It cannot reasonably be concluded that the 
Utah legislature would have, in the subsequent enact-
ments, dealt so carefully and comprehensively with the 
subject and striven so conscientiously to afford the neces-
sary protection to the public interest, if it had at the 
same time intended to leave in operative existence an 
earlier provision dealing with the same subject which is 
so totally lacking in comprehensiveness and in desirable 
safeguards. The purpose of the later legislation certainly 
could be circumvented and defeated if there remained in 
existence a provision so general, so brief, and so defi-
. cient in the ordinary provisions for due process, to be 
availed of by a board of county commissioners which, 
for one reason or another, should find the provisions of 
the later enactment too burdensome, or otherwise un-
suited to its purposes and objectives. 
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While it is true that this Court, like others, has in the 
past shown a proper reluctance to find a repeal by im-
plication of an Act of the Utah Legislature, it should not 
hesitate to reach such a· result when the earlier act and 
the later enactments on the same subject cannot by any 
reasonable construction be harmonized and given coter-
minous operative e·ffect. This is particularly true in a 
case such as this where the public interest would be so 
vitally and adversely affected by a decision that the 
earlier act remains in operative existence and available 
as an atternative to the later and more comprehensive 
and satisfactory enactments. 
The rule that is applicable here is well stated, with 
extensive citation of authority, in Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, 3rd Edition, Horack, Volume 1, Section 
2018, as follows: 
"The intent to repeal all former laws upon 
the subject is made apparent by the enactment 
of subsequent comprehensive legislation establish-
ing elaborate inclusions and exclusions of the per-
sons, things and relationships ordinarily asso-
ciated with the subject. Legislation of this sort 
which operates to revise the entire subject to 
which it relates, by its very comprehensiveness 
gives strong implication of a legislative intent 
* * * to repeal former statutory law upon the 
subject * * * ." 
Thus it is seen that a complete revision of the subject 
matter of a statute reverses the ordinary presumption 
against an implied repeal. We have that here. We have 
also irreconcilable conflict and repugnancy if it is as-
22 
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sumed that the 1933 Statute was applicable to the type 
of financing here in controversy. 
The Court should hold either ( i) that Section 8, 
Chapter 6a, Title 19, is inapplicable to projects and the 
type of financing here in controversy or (ii) that, if ap-
plicable, such provision was repealed by the subsequent 
enactment of con1prehensive legislation on the subject. 
POINT 2. THE STATUTES AND DEFENDANT'S PRO-
CEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Title 19, Chapter 6 is unconstitutional and void in 
that it is contrary and repugnant to Article I, Section 
2, Article I, Section 7 and Articles VI, Section 29, Con-
stitution of Utah. 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: 
"All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform their 
government as the public welfare may require." 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution provides: 
"The Legislation shall not delegate to any 
special commission, private corporation or asso~ 
ciation, any powe-r to Inake, supervise or inter-
fere with any n1unicipal improvement, money, 
property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, 
or to perform any municipal functions." 
If a sewer district organized under Title 19, Chapter 
6a, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is an "arm of the govern-
ment" not subject to the constitutional and statutory 
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debt limi~ti9n~, as '}las been held in th~ c~s~ of Tygeson 
v. Magna Water Company, 116 Utah "-----, 226 Pac. 2nd 
127, then the Court should hol<:I that the Salt L~e City 
Suburban Sewer District is unconstitutional in that 
' under Section 8 : 
(a) It is special commission assuming, supervis-
ing, or interfering with municipal functions 
in violation of Article VI, Section 29 and 
Article I, Section 2, Constitution of Utah. 
(b) By vesting supervisory and control power in 
the County Commission, the residents o.f the 
district are deprived of their political powers 
and the right to reform or alter the district, 
or remove the controlling officers, as the wel-
fare of the district or the system may require 
in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution. 
(c) That Section 8, Title 19, Chapter 6a is uncon-
stitutional and void in that it is contrary and 
repugnant to the 5th Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United 'States and to Arti-
cle I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah, in that 
it deprives the residents and property owners 
in said district of their liberty and property 
without due process of law. 
In the Tygesen case, supra, this Court in holding 
that a "district" created under Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 
1949, was not a "speci~ commission" did so upon the 
grounds that once the County Commission had initiated 
the district, the commission function ceased, and the dis-
trict board functioned autonomously from the Commis-
sion and hence was an "arm of go:vernment." 
At page 130, of 226 Pac. 2nd, the Court said: 
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'Assuming, without conceding, that the term 
'municipal functions' as used in Art. VI, Sec~ 29, 
applied to the functions of counties as well as 
cities and towns, nevertheless, plaintiff's conten-
tion is not tenable. The 1nanagen1ent and control 
of the Intprovmnent Districts and its properties 
and effects are lw the Act vested in a Board of 
Trustees even th~ug·h these districts are initiated 
by the county connnission. Their operations will 
be separate and distinct from any of the func-
tions assumed by the eounties in those unincor-
porated cities or towns. Although these opera-
tions ntight be in the same territorial boundaries 
as the improventent districts, they will have no 
control ·over the property or effects of the counties 
or of the manner of the performance of any of the 
functions which the counties have assumed. These 
·improvement districts are similar to the Metro-
politan \Vater Districts and the Water Conserv-
ancy Districts. In the :Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict ~\ct the initiating agencies were the legisla-
tive bodies of the cities desiring the districts, 
in the vV ater Conservancy Act the district courts 
upon petition of a specified percentage of prop-
erty owners were the agencies through which the 
districts could be established, whereas in the 
In1provement District Act under consideration the 
Legislature has seen fit to give· the duty to the 
county commissioners of the counties in which 
it is desired to establish a district. In all of these 
acts once the initiating agencies have acted and a 
district has been formed their functions cease and 
the governing body of the district assumes full 
control of the district and its properties. This 
court has held that the Metropolitan Water Dis-
tricts and the Water Conservancy Districts or-
ganized under those Acts were separate and dis-
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__ , 
tinct arms of the government and not special com-
missions, boards, private corporations or asso-
ciations within the purview of the constitutional 
prohibition. See Lehi City v. Meiling, City Re-
corder, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 and Patterick 
v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 
55, 145 P. 2d 503. The fact that proceedings to 
initiate an Improvement District is left to the 
county commissioners of the counties in which the 
Districts can be formed might lend some support 
to an argument that a district would not be a 
separate and distinct arm of the government but 
Inerely be an arm of a county for the purpose of 
carrying out a county function, we·re it not for 
the fact that once the District is actually organ-
ized the county has no further connection with the 
District except the ministerial one of levying any 
taxes certified to it by the Board of Trustees, a 
duty of the county which is similar. to that per-
formed by it for Boards of Education under the 
provisions of Sec .. 75-12-10, U.C.A. 1943. Once 
the District is formed the Board of Trustees have 
full control and supervision of tP,e property and 
the conduct of affairs of the District. The District 
must have its own seal and its Board of Trustees 
may sue and be sued. ·Also the taxes which are 
certified by the Board to the county commission-
ers can be levied only on property within the Dis-
trict. If a District were merely an arm of the 
county then the general taxes levied whethe-r used 
for benefits inuring to the District or not should 
be levied against all residents of the county rather 
than on those only within the District, just as soon 
as they are for other county functions. It being 
the duty of this court where possible to uphold 
the validity of an act rather than declare it uncon-
stitutional, see Lehi City v. Meiling, City Re-
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corder, supra, and Patteriek Y. Carbon Water 
Con~ern1ney District, supra, we are of the opin-
ion that an Improve1uen t District is a separate 
arin of the govenunent and not a mere adjunct 
of a county perfonning eounty functions." 
In the case at bar the Comn1ission not only estab-
lishes the district, but thereafter has complete control 
over it. It alters, n1anages en1ployees and other officers 
and exercises supervisory powers. It determines rates 
and charges. It detern1ines who shall connect up and 
what fee, charge or penalty shall be imposed. 
In Lehi City v. :Jleiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 Pac. 2nd 
530, the Court held the Metropolitan Water District Act 
did not create a "special commission" even though the 
members of the Board were appointed by the govern-
ment authorities, since the electors of the district voted 
on the establishment of that type of selection of its board 
members. 
Under Title 19, Chapter 6, Section 8, the electors 
have no say regarding the establishment o.f the district, 
nor in the selection of officers. 
The Commission is elected by and responsible to the 
people of the whole county. They are not elected by, nor 
are they responsible to, the voters of the district only. 
Thus the pow-er to create the district and the power to 
control, operate and manage the system is vested in a 
board not responsible or accountable to the people ... 
and the only people . . . who are concerned with fees, 
costs, financing, operation and control. 
At page 548, of 48 Pac. 2nd, Justice Wolfe, in his 
concurring opinion in· the Meiling case said : 
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'~The Legislature has not set up an entity and 
directly given it powers. It has permitted the 
people of the various cities and towns which are 
to be included in the territorial limits of the entity 
to set up such an entity which when and if they 
do, 1nay exercise certain powers. If the people 
choose not set it up, no power comes into being. 
The people, themselves, in the last analysis, have 
control of the situation." 
Sections 2 to 6 of Chapter 6a of Title 19, provide 
for an exercise of power, a voice by the people, 
and might possibly meet the rules laid down in 
the Tygeson and Melling cases. In the case at bar, how-
ever, the commission chose to ignore these provisions 
and are proceeding solely under the authority of Sec-
tions 1 and 8. Sections 1 and 8 of the Act give the resi-
dents of the district no voice in its creation, size, obliga-
tion to be inc11:rred, sharing of the burden, method of 
payment, operation or control, but leaves all these funda-
mental and basic rights to a commission not subject to 
selection, control or removal by residents of the district. 
We submit this constitutes a "special commission" within 
the inhibition of Article VI, Section 29 and deprives the 
residents of the district of the rights guaranteed by Arti- , 
cle I, Section 2. 
As heretofore stated, the Commission is acting solely 
under the provisions of Section 1 and 'Section 8 of Chap-
ter 6a, Title 19. 
Section 1 provides that a district may be created by 
the commission upon a petition by "10% of the people." 
Who constitutes 10% of the people, whether they include 
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men, women or children is not- known. · Whether they 
must reside in the district or may reside outside the dis-
trict in the county, or may reside anywhere in the state 
or whether they need be property owners in either the 
district, county or state is not known. 
Section S provides for the borrowing of funds and 
the issuance of revenue bonds. 
In neither Section are the following procedures 
provided: 
(a) No provision is made for a hearing on the 
creation of the district. 
(b) No procedure is provided for protesting the 
establishment of the district. 
(c) :N 0 procedure is provided for a property 
owner to protest having his property includ-
ed in the district confines, if said property 
will not be directly benefited by the proposed 
improvement. 
(d) No provision is made for the filing and hear-
ing of protests in connection with the issu-
ance of bonds. 
(e) No election procedure is provided nor is any 
right given to vote whether bonds should 
be issued. 
(f) No provision is made for hearings in regard 
to the imposition of charges and regulations 
of rates. 
Due process of law requires the above rights in the 
creation and financing of public improvements. 
In Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500, 118 Pac. 487, re-
lating to drainage districts, the Court at page 490 of 118 
Pac. said: 
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"In giving legal effect to the foregoing prin-
ciple in cases like the one at bar, it is not neees-
sary that a hearing be had at any particular 
stage of the proceedings by which rights may be 
effected or that the hearing be had before a regu-
larly constituted court of justice; but it is neces-
sary that a hearing be given at some time and 
that the same be had before some officer tribunal 
' ' board, or court to whom the person whose prop-
erty is affected may present his evidence, objec-
tions and arguments, to the end that the officer, 
tribunal, board or court may be enabled to fairly 
and intelligently pass upon and determine the 
questions presented for decision." 
And commenting upon the Argyle case the court in Lund-
berg v. Irrigation District, 40 Utah 83, 119 Pac. 1039, 
stated: 
"It was because the drainage law failed to 
give the landowner an opportunity to be heard be-
fore a proper tribunal who had power to hear 
any objection he might have against having. his 
lands included within the proposed district, that 
impelled us to hold the drainage law invalid up-
on the ground that the landowner's property may 
be taken without due process of law." 
In Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 
106 Utah 55, 145 Pac. 2nd 503, the Court speaking 
through Justice Wade, held the statutory provisions of 
Section 100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which pro-
vided for a filing of the petition protesting the creation 
of the district satisfied the due process provisions of the 
constitution. At page 508 Justice Wade states: 
"Section.100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 
above quoted, provides for the filing of a petition 
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protesting the er~ation of the district and for the 
dis1nissal of the original petition in case it is 
signed by the requi~ite nlunber of landowners of 
the required value.. rrhat Section also provides 
that any landowner within the district 1nay contra-
Yert the facts alleged in the original petition and 
in case the court finds that the facts proved are 
not sufficient lmder the statute to justify the cre-
ation of the district that the original petition shall 
be denied." 
Justice \Y olfe in his concurring opinion stated at 
page 51-! of 1-!5 Pac.: 
··It becomes evident that due process requires 
only that each landowner be given notice and a 
hearing before his lands are included within the 
boundaries of the district and before they are as-
sessed for making the proposed improvement. He 
has no constitutional right to require a vote to 
det~rmine whether the majority want such an im-
provement constructed. This latter is purely a 
question of legislative policy. A district could 
· be organized without notice or hearing so long 
as each landowner was given a hearing on the 
question of \vhether his lands have been benefited 
and should ·be assessed to pay for the said im-
provement." 
"While, as a hove indicated, due process does 
not require that affected landowners be given a 
chance to vote on the desirability of the construct-
ing of the proposed improvement, it certainly is 
consistent with our principles of government to 
follow such a procedure. Thus before organizing 
conservancy districts and making other improve-
ments which will be paid for by ass~ssing the 
lands benefited, it is not surprising that legisla-
tures often provide a procedure by which the 
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· A:ffec~ed land owners can voice their disapproval, 
and 1f the objectors are sufficient in number, de-
feat the construction of the proposed improve-
ment." 
And in reygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, at 
page 132 and 133, of 226 Pac. 2nd, the court upheld Chap-
ter :M, Laws of Utah, 1949, as against the contention 
that it violated the due process clause of the Constitution 
because the 0ourt found that ample opportunity was 
given to file objections and protests and have a hearing 
on said objections and protests before the property of the 
protestants could be included in the district for assess-
ment purposes. 
Neither 'Section 1 nor Section 8 of Title 19, Chapter 
6a provides for any hearing, any protest or any determin-
ation of benefits to property before the obligation to pay 
is placed upon the property owner. And it is hereto-
fore pointed out these are the only Sections of the Act 
under which the respondents have attempted to proceed 
in the case at bar. 
THE ACTS OF THE COMMISSION IN PURPORTING 
TO ACQUIRE, CONSTRUCT AND FINANCE SEWER SYS-
TEM WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND ILLEGAL 
AND DENIED THE RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
Respondents may argue that due process under the 
"special fund" doctrine does not require adherence to 
procedures outlined in the next preceding argument since 
no-one is deprived of any right under a revenue bond 
financing scheme. However, it is our position that due 
process of law requires adherence to fundamental due· 
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process ·whenever action is taken by a .public body ... While 
respondents have titled, called and represented the pres-
ent plan as a revenue bond plan we contend that they 
have proceeded to adopt direetly and indirectly the com-
pulsory features incident to assessn1ent financing and 
have so far departed fron1 the limitations of the "special 
fund" doctrine that the present plan in effect is not under 
the "special fund" doctrine. 
This Court has had occasion to construe the "special 
fund" doctrine in several cases : 
Barnes v. Lehi City, 7-! Utah 321, 279 Pac. 
S7S; 
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 144, .28: 
Pa.c. 2nd 144; · 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 Pac. 2nd 161 ; 
rtah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 
l' tah 203, 7 4 Pac. 2nd 1191 ; 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden City, 95 
"Gtah 161, 79 Pac. 2nd 61. 
In the above cited cases this Court has approved, 
with limitations, the "special fund" doctrine. 
The "special fund" doctrine permits the financing of 
projects regardless of the statutory debt limitations, 
provided, the payment of the obligation incurred is made 
solely from the revenues earned by the project. FU.nds 
owned by an existing municipal utility may not be used 
to pay the obligations incurred in constructing an addi-
tional utility free from the debt limitations, Fjelstead 
v. Ogden City, supra. Nor may a governing body of a 
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municipality or company pledge tax funds for payment 
f " 'al f d" o speC! un revenue bonds. Cases supra. 
Nor can such governing body do indirectly what it is 
prohibited from doing directly. In Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. Provo City, it is stated at page 1207-1208 of 74 Pac. 
2nd: 
. '''l'hese bonds, being by their terms and by the 
ord1nance authorizing their issuance, strictly reve-
nue bonds, to be paid only from the revenues re-
ceived fron1 the sale of electrical power from the 
plant to be erected, may not, directly or indirectly, 
be a charge on, or paid from revenues derived 
from, taxation. 'l'his is the gist, the crux, and the 
basis of the special fund doctrine. Any other con-
struction would make them a 'debt' within the 
constitutional inhibition, and void the whole issue. 
And since the city is, by the Constitution, pro-
hibited from incurring debts beyond the specified 
limit, they cannot by subterfuge or indirection do 
that which they could· not do openly and directly. 
'fhe debt inhibition was written into the Consti-
tution to protect the citizens from, and assure 
them that there would be no excessive tax burden 
imposed upon then1. This because the duty of, 
and necessity for, payment of a tax is not optional 
or contractual, but a burden imposed not with the 
consent, but often against the will, of the tax-
payer. There is the further reason that a tax 
becomes a lien upon the property of the taxpayer 
and may be a means of divesting hi1n of his prop-
erty. By its express terms the Constitution makes 
the limitations and inhibitions on the taxing 
power mandatory and prohibitory. Article 1, S. 
26. If these provisions of the ordinance quoted 
above were construed to Inean that the city must, 
or the manager of the plant could, fix rates for 
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power either on the eitiz~ns or on the eity for 
power used by it, on a basis that n1ust produce 
sufficient r~Yenue to pay the interest and the 
bonds as th~y Inature, r~gardl~:-;s of the amount of 
power used or consmned, the ei ty would be made a 
guarantor of the bonds, and not 1nerely a guar-
antor of good faith in operating the plant.· F'or 
the city to be a guarantor of the bonds, regardless 
of reYenues receiYed, would 1uake the obligation a 
debt within the meaning of the Constitution. It ts 
the fact that the bonds are only payable from the 
revenues of_the utility, and cannot, if any event be 
paid from tax revenues, that takes them out of 
the debt limitation and upholds the special fund 
doctrine.'' 
In the instant case no election was ever held. No dis-
trict was created by vote, no bond issue was ever author-
ized by the electors. X o provision for lien or penalty was 
authorized by the electors. 
The Commission without passing any resolution or 
ordinance had two types of application forms prepared. 
One provided for a lien on the property if charges be-
came delinquent. (Exhibit 1) The other, alternative 
application (E~it 4), provides that to escape the lien 
provision the applicant had to post bond or cash equal 
to 18 months advance payment. (Estimated at $54.00 
assuming the charges do not increase.) Statements were 
made that an ordinance (Exhibit U) under criminal pen-
alty would compel residents to connect up to the sewer. 
Reference was then made that the ordinance would pro-
vide for a lien in any event. (Exhibit U) 
It was stated under the plan if a resident did not sign 
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an application form by the 31st day of· July (later by 
"gracious fiat" extended to August 31st) it would cost 
such resident $100.00 more to then apply for the service. 
What choice did a resident have~ 
Among the essentials of the "special fund" doctrine 
is that the people voluntarily subscribe to the project 
and voluntarily subscribe to the offered service. In Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, supra, this Court 
speaking through Justice Wolfe said at page 1196 and 
1197 of 7 4 Pac. 2nd: 
"* * * we well might have taken such view of 
it, for if the framers of the numerous constitu-
tions wherein a debt limit was included had been 
asked, 'do you mean this provision to cover a case 
where a city or town may be able to provide its 
inhabitants with services by the construction of 
projects which will not be a charge against taxes 
but which may be built entirely by the proceeds 
of bonds which provide that their only source 
of payment shall be from the revenues of the proj-
ect~' The answer we may well imagine would be, 
'we mean these debt limiting provisions as a pro-
tection against burdening the tax-paying inhabi-
tants with too great a load and at the same time 
to prevent cities from obligating themselves for 
expenditures for any current year beyond the 
current revenue which it may reasonably be ex-
pected they will during that year obtain, but we 
certainly would not want to prevent the people 
of any city from obtaining the fruits of community 
life by preventing them from enjoying those serv-
ices which they may obtain by voluntary pay-
ments for the services to a project built by monies 
loaned by persons willing to look altogether to the 
income derived from such services voluntarily 
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subscribed for by the inhabitants'." (Italics ours) 
The plan advanced by the defendants is an attempt 
J to coerce the residents into doing what the commission 
could not do directly. 
The defendants' coercive plan reduced to its shortest 
form is: 
1. You residents have no voice in creating the 
district. 
You residents are compelled by ordinance to 
conneet to the system, with penalty for fail-
ure to so connect. 
3. You sign an application which will put a lien 
on your house for failure to pay ... or keep 
18 months' advance payment on desposit at 
all tin1es. 
4. Sign up by August 31, 1952, or we will assess 
you $100.00 penalty ... and force you by ordi-
nance to sign up anyway. 
5. If any charge is unpaid, we will shut off your 
culinary water. 
What choice, what voluntary action was left to the 
residents when the commission presented its scheme 
to the residents~ 
What method could be more arbitrary~ What 
scheme could be more coercive~ What plan could be 
more capricious~ 
The residents were denied due process in that the 
proposed plan did not attempt to assess the obligation 
to pay proportionate to the benefits received. 
In the "plan" not only were the requirements of 
Section 2 to 6 of Chapter 6a not followed, but the only 
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charges made are against those who have homes in the 
district and are compelled to connect up to the system. 
No charge is made against those owning vacant lots 
fronting upon the sewer line, even though such lots may 
be greatly benefited and their market value greatly en-
hanced, the owner of such vacant lot or lots is not re-
quired to pay one red cent of the cost. Due process of 
law requires the equal sharing of the burden in propor-
tion to the benefit received. The present plan is discrim-
inatory and illegaL 
The financial burden for constructing the plan is 
placed upon 8600 home owners. The system itself is 
designed for a capacity of 40 to 45 thousand homes. 
The owners of the vacant property wherein it is thought 
that ultimately an additional 30,000 or more homes 
will be built are not required to pay lOc in financing 
a system from which they will be direct beneficiaries. In 
other. words, the plan proposes to saddle upon approx-
imately 191f2% of the total capacity of said sewer system, 
the burden of paying for a system designed not only for 
themselves, but for the other 80%. 
It may be argued that the cost per home owner 
will be reduced as the area increases in population. Such 
a. theory asks the home owners of the district to assumE 
an obligation beyond their capacity to pay on thf 
assumption that later others will help them pay. Whethe1 
economic conditions will prevail which will continue the 
building program that has prevailed in the last six years 
is not known.. Whether economic reversals, recessions 
or even depression may be our lot in the near future is 
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not known. What is known and what would become legal-
ly binding upon 8,600 home owners is the obligation to 
construct a systen1 designed for 1nore than 40,000 homes 
and the requirement of pledging their property for its 
paJinent, con1e what 1nay. No satisfactory answer has 
been given to this question, and others raised in the 
Holladay Petition, by the County Commission. 
In Brown Y. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 P. 455, 
the Oourt said : 
"The doctrine of the authorities is that when-
ever it is sought to deprive a person of his prop-
erty, or to create a charge against it, preliminary 
to, or which may be made the basis of, taking it, 
the owner n1ust have notice of the proceeding, 
and be afforded ail opportunity to be heard a.s to 
the correctness of the assessment or charge. It 
matters not what the character of the proceeding 
may be, by virtue of which his property is to be 
taken-whether administrative, judicial summary, 
or otherwise-at some stage of it, and before the 
property is taken or the charge becomes absolute 
against either the owner or his property, an 
opportunity for the correction of wrongs and 
errors which may have been committed must be 
given. Otherwise the constitutional guaranties 
above cited are infringed. 
"Learned dissertations upon the meaning of 
the phrase, 'due process of law' have been writ-
ten by judges and lawwriters, but as applicable 
to summary proceedings of the character under 
consideration, its meaning is comprehended in 
the foregoing paragraph. If the law authorizing 
the proceedings provides for notice to the owner 
of the property to be specified time or place, 
before a board or tribunal competent to ad-
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minister proper relief, in order .th~t he may be 
heard concerning the correctness of the charge 
before it is made conclusive, the constitutional 
requirement~ are satisfied. But when the validity 
of a law or ordinance is questioned without such 
notice or hearing, the objection is not obviated 
by proof that a hearing has been had, as a 
matter of form, in the case. Nor does it satisfy 
the constitutional requirements that the assess-
ment is fair and just. A valid assessment cannot 
be made under an invalid law or ordinance, and 
its constitutionality is to be tested not by what 
has been done under it, but by what it authorizes 
to be done by virtue of its provisions." 
The Michigan Supreme Court in the case of City 
of Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 6 L.R.A. 54 stated: 
"No legislative or municipal body has the 
power to impose the duty of performing an act 
upon any person which it is impossible for him 
to perform, and then make his non-performance 
of such a duty a crime, for which he may be pun-
ished by both fine and imprisonment. It needs 
no argument to convince any court or citizen, 
where law prevails, that this cannot be done; and 
yet such is the effect of the provisions of the 
Statute and by-law under consideration." 
THE COMMISSION HAS ACTED ARBITRARILY, CAPRI-
CIOUSLY AND UNLAWFULLY. 
1. In creating an indebtedness in excess of that 
permitted by Article XIV, Section 4, Consti-
tution of Utah. 
2. In creating a bond indebtedness in violation ;~ 
of the procedures required by Title 19, Chap-
ter 10, Section 1, Utah Code. Annotated, 1943. ·.·.~·' 
We have heretofore set out the argument that Title i 
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19, Chapter 6a· establishes it "'special oommission" in 
violation of Article YI, Section 29 and Article XI, Sec-
tion 5 of the Constitution. Should the Court hold, how-
ever, that the act does not create a "special commission", 
but authorizes the County Commission to perform a 
County function, then said action of the Commission 
is invalid as creating a debt in excess of that permitted 
by Article XIY, Section 4 of the Constitution and for 
incurring a bonded indebtedness in contravention of 
Title 19, Chapter 10, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. 
We have heretofore pointed out that the present 
plan does not conform to the. "special fund" doctrine, 
since the residents are compelled to accept the offered 
service and guarantee payment of the charges, and 
thereby guarantee payment of the bonds, by liens against 
their property. The lien, in effect, pledges the property 
in payment of the .bonds. It is stipulated that the 
assessed valuation of the district is 22 million dollars. 
Section 4, Article XIV of the Constitution limits the 
indebtedness of the County to 2% of the assessed valua-
tion of taxable property. The proposed indebtedness 
of 8 million dollars for the sewer system is thus in 
excess of such limitation. Further, a bonded indebted-
ness must be created by election pursuant to Section 
19-10-1, Utah Code Anno1tated, 1943. No election has 
ever been held as therein required. 
Should the Court hold that the district is quasi-
municipal, or "an arm of the government" not subject to 
the debt limitation of the constitution and the statute, 
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the Court should still find the proposed plan as invalid 
for failure to follow the statutory provisions under 
which the district was created and by which assess-
ments may he made agains1t property under Title 19, 
Chapter 6a. 
Sections 2 through 6 of Chapter 6a provide the 
method for assessment of property to finance the pro-
jects permitted therein. Admittedly these methods, pro-
cedures and limitations were notfoHowed in the present 
plan .. 
The only defense the defendants can have is that 
assessment is not the method pursued. We contend not 
only is it assessment, but assessment to which all who 
benefit do not pay equally and in many cases bene-
ficiaries ·are not required to pay aJt all. 
The essence of assessment is the levying of a charge 
against prop~rty for a benefit inuring to the property 
and which assessment becomes a lien against the prop-
erty. ·~ 
The plan of defendants is the assessment of a 
charge (connection fee and monthly service charge) 
agains!t a home owner for a benefit, which charge, if 
not paid, becomes a lien against the property. ;~ 
In the usual assessment payment is made by the 
owner and the lien discharged. In the present plan the 
lien attaches if payment is not made and is discharged 
when paid. In both cases, if payment of the assess-
ment or charge is not paid the property may be sold 
to satisfy and discharge the lien. If there is a difference 
between these two, we submit it is a difference of form 
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and color and not of substance. 
The following cases support the proposition that in 
order to create a lien the authority of the Legislature 
is necessary and the mere regulation by the company 
or district is not sufficient: 
Turne-r v. Revere 'Yater Co., 171 1\tfass. 329, 
50 N.E. 634, 40 L.R.A. 657: 
Linne v. Bredes, ±3 'V ashington 540, 86 P. 858, 
6L.R.A. (N.S.) 707; 
Covington v. Rattern1an, 128 Ky. 336, 108 
S."~. 297, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 923. 
It is generally held that in construing the legality 
of a bond issue the Constitution and Statutes are more 
strictly construed when the bonds have not been issued 
and sold. 
In Stearn v. Fargo (North Dakota), 122 N.W. 403, 
26 L.R.A. {N.S.) 665: 
"It may be stated as a rule that, in consider-
ing the legality of a proposed bond issued by a 
City, Courts construe the Constitution and· stat-
utes more strictly than_ they are construed in 
determining the validity of bonds already issued 
and disposed of. (21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 
33, 45) ." 
The instant case in our opinion is one in which the 
"special fund" doctrine has been stretched to the point, 
which, if upheld by this Court, would be used as an 
artifice to do those things which are forbidden by the 
Constitution. This thought has been expressed in the 
case of Colorado Central Power Company v. Municipal 
Power Development Co., 1 Fed. Supp. 961: 
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"The so'"called 'revenue bonds' may be de 
scribed as an artifice or scheme to do that which 
the Constitution declare·s to be against public 
policy and attempts to forbid. It should not 
be encouraged." 
IF A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UN-
CERTAIN, AND AMBIGUOUS, IT MAY BE HELD UNCON-
STITUTIONAL AND INVALID. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL 
GROUND WHY THE ENTIRE ACT SHOULD BE HELD UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Before a district may be created by a board of 
county commissioners with provisions for special im-
provement district assessments or with provisions of 
financing through revenue bonds, "10% of the people 
must petition for any such improvement." Section 19 
6A-1, U.C.A. 1943. But what is meant by "10% of the 
people"? This jurisdictional requirement is vague, in-
definite, uncertain, and ambiguous for several reasons. 
First, it cannot be determined from the section 
whether "10% of the people" means 10% of the people 
living in the entire county, or 10% of the people living 
in that part of the county outside of the incorporated 
cities and towns in such County, or 10% of the people 
in the proposed district. Any one interpretation could 
be valid depending upon the type of proposed district. 
S.econdly, no rule is given as how the 10% is to be 
calculated. Certain tests could be used, such as the 
latest general census, the number of registered voters, 
the number of people owning property. Coupled with 
this inadequacy is the uncertainty as to the time of the 
count. Thus if a census count gover:ns, the population 
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could incr~.ase gr~11tly in ~ pos~i~~~t period of nine years 
from the latest general census. During such a ·period, 
population could double. On the other hand if the count 
is based upon ta...xpa.yers, a more current tabulation 
would result in a n1ore accurate count. 
Thirdly, countless interpretations have been given 
to the word "people." Which one of the following defi-
nitions did the legislature mean? 
The aggregate or n1ass of the individuals, Solon vs. 
State, 11-± S."\V. 349; a political society comprising the 
entire population of all ages, sexes, and conditions, 
Ex. Rel. Elder vs. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167; per-
sons generally, an indefinite number of men and W?II1en~ 
folks, population, or part of population, In re Silkman, 
8-± N.Y.S. 1025, 88 App. Div. 102; those who by the 
existing constitution, are crowned with political rights, 
Koehler vs. Hill, 60 Iowa 63, 50 N.W. 609; inhabitants 
of State, White vs. Larrimore and W. Irrigation Co., 
1 Colo. App. 480, 29 P. 906; qualified voters, ,State vs. 
City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242; the free 
white male inhabitants, above the age of twenty-one, 
State vs. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682,48 N.W. 739. 
AJithough by judicial interpretation, it may be de-
termined what the legislature meant by this phrase, we 
submit that a jurisdictional requirement such as this 
cannot be stated in such general terms. Whether or not 
the persons who have allegedly petitioned to create the 
district in question qualify under the definition that 
might be adopted is highly questionable. 
The County Commission adopted as its criterion the 
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people living in the district. This interpretation would 
establish a criterion in conflict with Section 19-6A-3 
which limits the right to protest to persons owning 
property in the district. 
Section 19-6a-2 to Sections 19-6A-7 inclusive deal-
ing with special assessment districts are rather detailed 
and are not subject to the same objections as Sections 
19-6a-1 and 19-6a-8. 
The latter section we have discussed previously 
as to the limited applicability thereof. Unless such an 
interpretation is followed we submit that the term 
"projects and special improvements as may be appro-
priate and possible under the laws of the U.S. relating 
thereto, as self liquidating projects" is anything but 
clear. 
The Legislature did not mean the projects and im-
provements to be those which complied with Federal 
laws in the sense that they were not illegal under any 
Federal statute. On the other hand if the Legislature 
were referring to projects and special improvements 
under the R.F.C., Public Works Administration or the 
other emergency relief measures, the language used 
fails to indicate such a reference. 
CHAPTER 23 B, LAWS OF UTAH, 1947 (THE "CURA- I 
TIVE" ACT) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID IN THAT • 
IT IS CONTRARY AND REPUGNANT TO THE PROVISIONS 4 
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 AND OF ARTICLE XI, SEC-
TION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION AS ATTEMPTING TO J 
GRANT UNLAWFUL PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND ~ 
FRANCHISES TO THE SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN ~ 
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SANITARY DISTRICT AND IS A PUBLIC LAW ENACTED 
WHERE A GENERAL LAW WOULD BE APPLICABLE. 
Later in the brief in our discussion of the resolutions 
of the conunission we illustrate that Chapter 23 B is 
not prospectiYe in application and does not cure or vali-
date the actions taken by the connnission during 1952. 
The present argun1ent is directed only at the unconstitu-
tionality of Chapter 23 B. 
Title 19, Chapter 6 a, Section 1 provides the board 
of county commissioners of any county may create spe-
cial in1provement, water supply, sewer or sanitary dis-
tricts outside of incorporated cities and towns, and flood; 
control districts inside or outside of incorporated cities 
and towns in such county. 
This Section authorizes the creation of several 
different types of improvement districts. 
Chapter 23 B, Laws of Utah 194 7, relied upon as 
validating omissions and irregularities in the creation 
of the Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Sewer District, 
is a special act attempting to validate irregularities and 
omissions in the creation of sanitary districts only. 
No attempt is made to validate irregularities or omis-
sions in the creation of any other type of improvement 
district. 
The only sanitary district ever attempted under 
Title 19, Chapter 6 a is, as far as we know, the Salt 
Lake City Suburban Sanitary Sewer District. 
State ex rel Richards v. Hammer, 42 N.J. Law 435, 
Nov. 1880. 
,:!(, * * the true principle requires something 
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more .than a mere designation by such character-
istics as will serve to. classify, for the character-
istics which thus serve as the basis of classifica-
tion must be of such a nature as to mark the 
objects so designated as peculiarly requiring ex-
clusive legislation. There must be substantial 
distinetion, having a reference to the subject 
matter of the proposed legislation, between the 
objects or places embraced in such legislation 
and the objects or places excluded. The marks 
of distinction upon which the classification is 
found must be such, in the nature of things, as 
.will, in some reasonable degree, at least, account 
for or justify the restriction of the legislation.' 
Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800, 802. 
"* * * or, to state it differently, though not 
so well, the true practical limitation of the legis-
lative power to classify is that the classification 
shall be upon some apparent natural reason, some 
reason suggested by necessity, by such a differ-
ence in the situation and circumstances of the 
subjects placed in different classes as suggest 
the necessity or propriety of different legisla-
tion with respect to them." 
In Lyte v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 90 
Utah ~69, 61 Pac. 2nd 1259, rehearing denied, 90 Utah 
377, 62 Pac. 2nd 1117, the Court had before it an analog-
ous situation. 
Section 104-21-31 provided: 
"The information or indictment must charge 
but one offense, but the same offense may be 
set forth in different forms under different 
counts ... " 
By Section 189 of the Liquor Control Act of 1935, 
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the Legislature ·penni tted two offenses .of the Act to be 
charged in one complaint. The Court held this pro-
vision of the Act to be unconstitutional as special legis-
lation. 
In confirming its opinion, the Court on rehearing 
said, page 1118, of 62 Pac. 2nd : 
~'* • • What apparent natural reason, or 
reason suggested by necessity, is there for per-
mitting more than one offense to be charged 
against one suspected of having offended against 
the Liquor Control Act (Laws 1935, c. 43) that 
does not apply to those suspected of having com-
mitted some other kind of offenses 1 What neces-
sity or propriety is there in charging two or more 
offenses against one who is believed to have 
offended against one or more of the provisions 
of the Liquor Control Act that' does not equally 
apply to those accused of committing offenses 
against other acts 1 We are at a loss to find any 
substantial reason for making a distinction be-
tween the number of charges that may be in-
cluded in one complaint involving an infraction 
of the Liquor Control Act that is not equally 
applicable to many, if indeed not all classes of 
offenses." 
What apparent natural reason, or reasons sug-
gested by necessity, is there for permitting validation 
of irregularities and omissions in the. proceedings for 
creation of one improvement district, that would not 
exist for another1 Should not all, or none of the irreg-
\'' ularities and omissions in all improvement districts be 
validated 1 
~. . The Legislature by limiting its validating act to 
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, 
sanitary districts only and excluding from the validat-
ing act, the validation of proceedings of the other dis-
tricts mentioned in the general law attempted to grant 
special immunities, privileges and franchises to the 
Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer District, and by such 
act enacted special legislation where a general act was 
applicable. It is clear that the only purpose of this 
act was to validate the irregularities of the sewer dis-
trict at issue; accordingly, to give any effect to the 
Curative Act would be to infringe the constitutional 
provision that "corporations for municipal purposes 
shall not be created by special laws." 
POINT 3. THE COMMISSION'S ACTS ARE ILLEGAL, 
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS. 
It must he recognized that a Board of County Com-
missioners does not have unlimited powers. If the Com-
mission is acting in a special capacity, such as trustees ~ 
of an improvement district, it must follow either the ~ 
procedures outlined in the enabling legislative act or if ~ 
no rules of procedures are outlined, some semblance of 
order must be observed. The usual method of carrying 
into effect a commission's powers is through resolutions 
or ordinances. We shall discuss later what must be 
adopted as an ordinance, but at the very least the Com-
mission, as the district's officials, could act only at I 
legally called meetings and pro,ceed to transact the 
:!~:: ~: r:::~:~i:::~ with usual procedures by passing 1 
An examination of the exhibits will show that until 
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I. 
g, 
April 5, 1948 such a course was followed. On that date 
the Commission, having considered the problem for 
over a year, faced with overwhelming opposition from 
those who were to pay the costs, and unable to construct 
because of excessiYe COSts had. the authority and WaS 
justified in taking action to abandon the project and 
to rescind any formal action previously taken. The fact 
that the County Attorney was present at the meeting 
and that the rescinding resolution was presented by 
his Chief Deputy conclusively proves that the legality 
of the action had been duly considered. Even if certain 
contracts with third parties had become vested, the 
Commission could and did do everything possible to 
"kill" the project. In so doing it followed procedures 
recognized by authorities. 
Thus in the case of Michigan v. Brassman, 11 N.E. 
2nd 538, the Supreme Court of Indiana after stating 
that vested rights of contract could not be interfered 
with by a subsequent rescinding resolution held: 
"We do not, however, hold that the original 
resolution could not be rescinded by the subse-
quent resolution in so far as parties who had no 
vested rights under the original resolution are 
concerned. See Dillon M un. Corp. Sect. 314 (Sect. 
584 in 5th Ed.) and authorities there cited." 
This Court in the case of Keigley v. Bench, 63 P. 
2nd 262, recognized the validity of the rescinding reso-
lution of Provo City Commission by holding that a 
referendum on a resolution that had been rescinded 
would be a useless act. 
See also State v. Funk (Ore.), 209 P. 113, whe·re it 
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T--Jf ~~. 
i 
·Wa.S held cthat SUCh power must be inherent in order to 
prevent an imposition ·through fraud, accident or mis-
take. 
To all intents and purposes the district sewer 
project remained abandoned for four years. Then the 
present Commission was prevailed upon by the fiscal 
agent (Ex. 0) to revive it. One of our main criticisms 
of the Commission is that action was not taken imme-
diately to dissolve the skeleton district created on Sep-
tember 9, 1946 and abandoned on April 5, 1948 either 
by resolution, declaratory judgment, or legislative ac-
tion. If such action had been taken, a new district could 
have been created and the sewer could have been con-
structed under Chapter 5a of Title 19-the latest leg-
islative procedure. Instead the Commission proceeded 
as if the April 5, 1948 resolution had never been adopted 
and as if it had full authority and jurisdiction to do 
anything the fiscal agent and the engineers recommended. 
During the entire year of 1952 up to October 6, 
1952 no formal action of any kind whatsoever was taken ·. 
to revive the project. Although the minutes of the Com-
mission during this period show that it did enter cer-
tain agreements with the fiscal agents, the engineers, 
and the depository, it at no time a-qthorized any Com-
missioner or anyagent of the Commission to call public 
n1eetings, issue literature, and offer agreements. How- .. 
ever, the Commission arbitrarily did issue pamphlets 
and demanded the people living in the district to sign < 
applications under threat of penalties. It was during ·i 
this period that defendants' exhibit 1 through 5 were j 
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circulated. X o formal action approving these exhibits 
was taken by the Commission. Inforn1ally, through 
newspaper ads. and finally by publication the people 
were notified of different deadlines for filing applica-
tions. \Y e submit that these so-called applications and 
contracts are nullities. ~-\.t this late date it is impos-
sible to learn whether the applications, the contracts 
and the contractual provisions contained therein, which 
we believe were the handiwork of the fiscal agents, have 
been formally approved by the Cmnmission. We are 
only certain of the fact that they are an example of a 
coercive method promoted by the defendants to secure 
applications under threat of penalty and now· have 
been approved only in the sense that they are being 
used as an argument why the project ~hould proceed. 
We repeat, that to date, the Board, either acting as a 
Commission or trustees of the district has taken no 
formal action either by motion, resolution, or order to 
approve or accept these agreements. 
We do not deem it necessary that it be determined 
at this time whether any contracts or agreements entered 
into by the Commission with the fiscal agent, the engi-
. neer, or other third parties impose any liability on 
Salt Lake County or the district. We d~ contend, how-
ever, these agreements are without binding effect, hav-
ing been approved when the district itself was defunct 
and abandoned. 
That the first resolution adopted by the Cmnmis-
sion on October 6, 1952 should be given any effect, is 
questionable. Definitely it cannot have any. retroactive 
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effect. See Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, 
Volume 2, page 920: 
"A repeal of a repealing ordinance, reviving 
the original, does so only from the date of the 
reviving ordinance. It has no retroactive effect. 
Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564." 
The defendant's attempt by resolution to say that 
the original resolution of March 18, 194 7 has been in 
full force and effect is without any significance or legal 
justification. An analogy would be if the 1947 legis-
lature had passed an act, the 1949 legislature then spe-
cifically re:pealed the act, and thereafter the 1951 legis-
lature attempted to re-enact the act with amendments 
and a provision that to all intents and purposes the act 
was to have been in full force and effect during the 
entire period of the repeal. 
A legislature, and we presume, a county commis-
sion can under certain circumstances re-enact a law 
or revive a resolution but neither a legislature or a 
-county commission has the power to turn back the 
clock and by edict, declare its enactment has had a four 
year retroactive effect. 
What purpose did the promoters of the "plan" have 
in mind in threatening a $100.00 penalty, when they I 
knew that no such penalty was then in effect or would 
be proposed in the final resolution, except to force, 
intimidate, and coerce residents to sign up immediately? 
Another objection to the $100.00 penalty is the fact 
that it is in conflict with the county ordinance duly 
adopted May 18, 1942. This ordinance, which was amend-
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ed as recently as ~lay 16, 1951, provides for $150.00 
connection fee, which fee n1ust be paid into the general 
fund. Either the County must amend this ordinance 
and delete this provision, or the connection fee coJ-
lected by the district will not be part of the district's 
revenue. The district's ordinances and resolutions have 
always declared the connection fee should be payable 
only to the district. However, until this general ordi-
nance is repealed, it will take precedence over any so-
called agreement or resolution passed by the county 
commission in its capacity as district 'trustees. It is 
· our position that because the ·ordinance proVided no 
penalty and because it was the only law in effect at the 
time the applications were distributed and demanded, 
any fee or penalty in conflict with the May .18, 1942 
orqinance was illegal. 
If we assume that the resolution of April 5, 1948 
was not effective (a concession which we are not willing 
to make), the only authority under which agreements 
could be submitted for sewer connections and under 
which penalties could be imposed was the resolution of 
March 7, 1947. But the defendants did not purport to 
1 be acting under the authority of the provisions of this 
resolution; to the contrary the connection fee and the 
penalties conflict with the provisions of this resolution. 
See page 29 (Ex. U) which sets up an initial service 
charge of $50.00 payable in advance, plus an additional 
payment of $99.00 in cash or $120.00 payable in four 
I! installments; if applications are filed after the letting 
, of the construction contract, the additional charge is 
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increased from $99.00 (cash) ·or· $120.00 (credit) to 
$140.00 in cash at $41.00 (cash) or $20.00 (credit). The 
delinquent date was the prior to letting of the first con-
struCJtion contract, not some arbitrary date. 
Not only do the provisions of the agreement for the 
connection fee and the penalty conflict with both the 
ordinance of May 18, 1942 and the abandoned resolu-
tion of March 17, 194 7 but they do not conform to the 
applicable provisions of the master resolution adopted 
October 6, 1952. The penalty in this resolution is fixed 
in the amount of $50.00 or 33113% of the connection fee. 
The penalty does not become effective if the "agreement 
is executed prior to the letting of the first construction 
contract." Arbitrarily the first penalty date had been 
set at July 31, 1952. Thereafter it was moved up to 
August 31, 1952 and subsequently in regard to a favored 
few it was moved up to September 20, 1952. 
Defendants' answer alleges "that numerous mass 
meetings wre held concerning financial plans proposed 1 
by the county." ~ 
As we have previously cited this Court has empha-
sized that voluntary participation is a feature of the 
Special Fund Doctrine. We have argued that the act 
under which the defendants have proceeded is uncon-
stitutional because it deprives the people of their rights. 
An unconstitutional inadequacy of the act cannot be 
remedied by gratuitous concessions of the defendants, 
such as holding mass meetings and accepting protests. 
Even these gestures were meaningless. To merely hold 
mass meetings and explain the plan is hardly due pro- 1 
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cess: The inadequacy of the procedure was emphasized 
if one attended such a meeting. It is true that the 
general plan· was outlined, yet the representatives of 
· the defendants could not and did not refer to any single 
order resolution or ordinance to substantiate their 
' ' representations because no resolution was in effect at 
the time the meetings were held. No proposed ordinance 
or resolution was available for study. It was not until 
October 6, 1952 when the resolutions were finally adopt-
ed that the people had anything. concrete to protest. 
The project and the method of financing of March· 17, 
1947 had been rescinded and abandoned so it would 
have been useless to protest the provisions of this- reso-
lution. What protests were filed, such as the protest 
of the Holladay Group, incorporated as part of the de-
fendants' answer, could only object to a nebulous pro ... 
posal which admittedly was subject to changes and 
amendments. At this time the proposed resolution or 
ordinance was not made available to the public for in-
spection; no engineering plan or report was on file and 
the plans and specifications themselves had not been 
completed. 
The hearing on August 25 (Ex. R) recognizes that 
1 the protests were i:ri regard to an "outline'' of a sewer 
plan. At said hearing the fiscal agents and the defend-· 
ants admitted that as of that date the total amount of 
f the bond issue had not been determined, the maturity 
dates had not been decided upon, and argued that the 
objections to tentative plans were . without foundation 
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because it was possible that the final plan would be 
changed. 
Finally, the objections which were raised at the 
mass meetings, those filed by the Holladay Group and 
those expressed at the hearings were merely taken under 
advisement. No provision was made for applying under 
protest, yet as is admitted in defendants' answer, "in 
excess of 390 individuals" signed under protest and the 
• Holladay protest contained 2645 signatures. Thus in 
spite of the fact that 44% of the owners of existing 
structures filing applications signified they protested 
the plan, no formal ruling was rendered on the filed 
protests and no announcements or rulings were made . 
after the public hearing. Instead without advance notice ' 
the defendants' plan was hurriedly adopted on October 
6, 1952. All of the objections previously raised in the 
Holladay petition and all of the arguments advanced 
at the public hearing were ignored, thereby nullifying 
the democratic expressions of the very people who will 
be forced to pay the costs. 
Again we cite the illegality of imposing upon 8600 
property owners the financial burden of paying for a . 
system designed for 45,000 connections (Holladay prO>-
test). We submit that it is arbitrary and capricious 1 
to compel under threats of criminal and financial penalty 
a person, such as a veteran, struggling to meet t~e ~ay- 1 
ments on his purchase money mortgage on h1s httle 
home, to agree to pay upwards of $1,200.00 for the 
1 
sewer and at the same time permit an owner of vast, 
unimproved acreage to pay nothing, if he chooses, for~ 
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the enhancement in value to his property by the im-
provements financed by others. 
POINT 4. THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OCTOBER 6, 
1952 ARE ILLEGAL, VOID, AND BEYOND THE POWER OF 
THE COnil\HSSION. 
\Ye shall now turn to the resolutions of October 6, 
i952. 
\Ve have previously analyzed the resolution of April 
5, 1948 (Ex. L) and we respectfully ask the Court to 
read this resolution should there by any doubt whether 
the 1948 Commission was advised as is denied by the 
first resolution (Ex. Y). \Ve have disputed the power 
to amend a resolution after it has been legally rescinded. 
We do not claim that the Commission could not have 
passed a resolution on October 6 which incorporated 
all of the sections of the March 18, 194 7 resolution but 
we do claim that the Commission could not do this 
indirectly for the sole purpose of taking advantage of 
the so-called Curative Act of 1947. 
There might be some justification for the amend-
, ment of the original resolution if it were determined 
soon after the adoption thereof that certain details of a 
resolution could be improved by amendments. However, 
it must be recognized that there was a span of 6 years 
~ between the date of the original creation of the district 
i and more than 5.:lj2 years between the date of the orig-
1· inal bonding resolution and the amending resolutions, 
and that more than four years had passed from the 
date of the abandonment of the project. 
- If the district had proceeded as originally planned 
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and changes in detail had been .required., an amendment 
would be in order. However, the facts were, that r..,e-
gardless of the rescinding and abandoning resolution, 
all parties interested considered the project dead. Vest-
ed rights, if any, of third parties had expired. There 
was no justification or valid reason to adopt this first 
resolution. 
It is apparent that the defendants are attempting 
tQ claim the benefits of Chapter 23B Laws of Utah 1947, 
the Curative Act. Even assuming, arguendo that the 
March 17, 1947 resolution could be revived, the amending 
resolution of October 6, 1952 and the third resolution 
do not come within the validating provisions of this act. 
The act was meant to correct any errors and irregular-
ities. It was not intended by the legislature to validate 
any subsequent ordinances or resolutions. The only 
authority given the board under the act is, "to proceed 
with the issuance of the bonds thereunder and to make 
such changes in the details of said bonds as it may find 
necessary." An analysis of the original resolution as 
purportedly amended by Ex. W, called the Master Reso-
lution, and implemented by Ex. X, the resolution pro-
viding for the issuance of an additional $3,850,000 bonds, 
clearly demonstrates that the defendants are not merely 
making changes in the details but are attempting to 
push through an entirely new project. 
I 
The following are some of the amendments the de-
fendants have assumed are "changes in details": ~ 
COST -The estimate has now been increased from 
$2,750,000.00 to $8,000,000.00. r~ 
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AUTHORIZED ISSUE-Authorized revenue bonds 
has been increased fron1 $2,750,000.00 to $6,600,000.00. 
PREJIIUJI-Premiums have been changed from 
$10.00 per bond redeemed in 1958 up to $20.00 for each 
bond redeemed after 1961 to $50.00 if redeemed prior 
to 1957 and $20.00 if redeemed after 1972. 
JIATURITIES-Originally the bonds became due 
$50,000.00 per annmu over a 28 y~ar period beginning 
1950 and ending 1977; under the amendments $50,000.00 
in bonds are due in the vears 1955 and 1956; $100,000.00 
is due per annmn for the next 22 years ; $200,000.00 is 
due in 1980 and 1981; $300,000.00 per annum is due for 
the next five years-1982-1986; $600,000.00 ·is due in 
1987. Maturity dates are provided for only $4,600,000.00 
in bonds; therefore, $2,000,000.00 of the authorized issue 
must hereafter be given maturity dates. 
CALLABLE RIGHTS-Originally, bonds were call-
able for redemption during the first 9% years without 
premium. This right was cancelled. 
IMMEDIATE SALE-The original resolution pro-
vided for immediate sale of $1,400,000.00 in bonds. The 
amending resolution provides for immediate sale of 
$4,600,000.00 in bonds. 
EXCESS AUTHORIZATION'-The amount auth-
orized in excess of the amount proposed to be issue~ has 
been changed fron1 $1,350,000.00 to $2,000,000.00. 
METHOD OF SALE-Originally, the resolution 
provided for an absolute sale to Lorrin W. Gibbs at a 
maximtun fixed interest cost of 31;4% ; the amendment 
provides for a sale "in such manner and on such terms 
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as may be provided or approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners." There is no limitation on the maximum 
interest and the bonds can be sold below par. 
(IT WAS THIS LATTER CHANGE AND THE 
FUTURE ACTION THAT MIGHT RESULT THAT 
WAS ONE OF· THE MAIN CAUSES FOR THE SALT 
LAKE COUNTY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 
TO BE ORGANIZED AND TO APPEAR IN THIS 
CASE. WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE DEFEND-
ANTS DELIBERATELY GAVE THEMSELVES 
THIS UNLIMITED POWER. THE FACT REMAINS, 
HOWEVER, THAT THE FISCAL AGENTS, OBLI-
GATED TO FIND A BUYER AND PERMITTED 
TO BUY THE BOND THEMSELVES, COULD 
LEGALLY PURCHASE THE BONDS AT A PRICE 
WITH SUCH INTEREST RATE AS WOULD BE 
VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PROPERTY OWN-
ERS OF THE DISTRICT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE 
BONDS ARE ADVERTISED FOR PUBLIC SALE 
AND NO BIDS ARE RECEIVED THE FISCAL 
AGENTS COULD OFFER TO BUY THE BONDS 
"AT A PRICE, INTEREST RATE, AND MATUR-
ITIES" FIXED BY THEM. THE ONLY CONDI-
TION ACCORDING TO THE CONTRACT IS THAT 
THE PRICE, INTEREST RATE, AND MATURITIES . 
MUST BE APPROVED AS TO LEGALITY BY THE 
FISCAL AGENT'S BOND ATTORNEY AND BY 
THE ENGINEERS AS TO FEASIBILITY. UNDER 
THIS CONTEACT (EX. 0) THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO RE-
FUSE SUCH A BID). 
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We have objected strenuously to the affirmative 
acts of the defendants which were adopted without legal 
justification. "~ e now must point out in which par-
ticulars the defendants haYe failed to act, and because 
of such failure, their resolutions are invalid. 
'V e respectfully refer the Court to the three reso-
lutions (Exhibits F, ,Y, and X). An attempt to arrive 
at a coherent analysis of them confuses even experts. 
Instead of one detailed resolution the reader must start 
with an outmoded plan, which is then altered piecemeal 
by another resolution, and further supplemented by a 
fragmentary addendum. The result is sixty-three pages 
of inconsistencies, a patch-work conglomeration, which 
a project of this magnitude does not deserve. If we 
compare the result with what authorities recommend, 
we are appalled. The reasons clarity is essential was 
stated in the case of Miller et al. v. State, 83 Ga. App. 
135, 62 S.E. 2nd 921 : 
"Such a resolution must reasonably show the 
nature, kind and location and such other facts as 
will with reasonable fullness and definiteness 
describe and define the undertaking including 
the estimated costs thereof. Another reason why 
these facts should appear in the resolution is that 
the citizens of the municipality have the right to 
object to the validation of the certificates on the 
grounds that the project is unreasonable or un-
sound and possibly others.· 
"The approximate fixing of the costs is as 
vital a part of the resolution as the authorization 
of the certificates. 
"While no tax can be levied to pay for such 
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·, ~: ... -:.:.:. ~n irp.pr:ovemeJJ:J · to be financed by revenue cer. 
tificates, the fixing of water and sewerage charges 
amounts in most ways to the same thing. A 
· water user has· as much interest ill his water 
rate as he has in the proposed assessment or tax 
for an improvement affecting him by additional 
assessments. 
"Unless a reasonable degree of definiteness 
is required in the ordinance, the door is left wide 
open for one of two undesirable consequences 
one is that a project may be carried out sub~ 
stantially different from the one or more fixed 
or alternative plans or parts of plans originally 
contemplated, or the selection of the project may 
be delated to an inferior authority contrary to 
law." 
Our Commission could not be more definite because 
the. engineers had not prior to the resolution submitted 
for their study an engineering feasibility report. (See 
stipulation dated November 13, 1952). It is no wonder, 
therefore, that in Section II (unamended) of Ex. U 
they have pro:vided; "The cost of the portion of the 
system which is to be- initially constructed, including 
all incidental expenses hereafter specified, is estimated 
to be not in excess of $2,750,000.00," yet suddenly, on 
page 27, Ex. X, the. total estimated cost is hiked to 
$8,000,000.00. While this may. be a nice round figure· it~ 
does not come within one and half niillion dollars of the 
estimate advanced by the engineers and represented as 
1 
the cost by defendants at the mass meetings (Stipula-, 
tion dated November 12, 1952). We wouldn't want to l 
accuse. the Con1mission of plann.0g to spend the differ-OJ 
'l 
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ence between $6,111,076 and $8,000,000, or $1,888,924 
on the fiscal agents' fees, attorneys' fees, and interest 
during construction. VVe, therefore, can only conclude 
that an arbitrary figure has been selected in order to 
give them unlimited leeway. 
Our Legislature has required that an engineer's 
report be submitted as to feasibility before bonds may 
be issued by municipalities. See Sections 15-7-40 and 
100-10-.f U.C.A. 1943. Under sections 19-6A-8 revenue 
' bonds may be issued to finance "the proposed project 
or special improvement." We submit this power should 
be construed strictly and that the Commission's authority 
to issue bonds should be limited to the actual cost of 
the project, and the total authorization should not ex-
ceed a sum equal to the engineers' estimate less the 
estimated initial payments. Such a strict construction 
is called for in passing on bond laws in connection with 
proposed issues not yet in the hands of third parties. 
See Stearn v. Fargo, supra, page 43 .. 
Evidently defendants recognized that they were 
authorizing an issue of $2,000,000.00 in excess of what 
was needed because the right to determine maturities 
and optional features is res~rved This proviso in and 
of itself renders the remainder of the resolutions mean-
ingless. How can a prospective buyer of the bonds with 
fixed maturities and options be certain that the Com-
mission will not after he has bid, offer for sale $2,000,-
000.00 of bonds falling due prior to those he is about 
to purchase 1 In effect this is the same as mortgaging 
property and reserving the right to place a later mort-
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gage of equal parity with another mortgagee, but the 
latter mortgage will become due earlier. Such a mort-
gage would demand a high rate of interest or an exces-
sive '·premium. Likewise reserving the unlimited right 
to issue $2,000,000.00 excessive bonds, no matter how 
the funds are to he used, cheapens the value of those 
first issued and will only result in ultimately the public 
paying exorbitant interest costs and premiums. 
Every principle of due process was violated by the 
defendants by the manner in which they adopted the 
resolutions on October 6, 1952. Basically instead of pro-
·ceeding by resolution, an all-inclusive ordinance should 
'have been adopted. The action taken that date was, in 
our opinion, the most important legislative enactment 
ever attempted by any Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners. Therefore the pronouncement of this 
Supreme Court in the case of Keigley v. Bench, supra, • 
is significant : 
"Of course, accurately speaking, an ordinance 
is the proper designation for legislative action." 
1 
We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court 
implement this recent opinion by adopting the views • I 
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which decided in the 1 
case of Van Hoven berg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 
S.W. 2nd 718 that a "resolution" or "order" is not a: 
law, but merely the form in which the legislative body. 
expresses an opinion, and an "ordinance" prescribes 
a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a 
"resolution" is of a special and temporary character. 
Acts of legislation by a municipal corporation which 
A 
66 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are to have continuing force and effect must be em-
bodied in "ordinances" while Inere n1inisterial arts may 
be in the form of "resolution" and where character 
requires an act to be done by ordinances, or where such 
a require1nent is in1plied by necessary inference, a 
resolution is not sufficient, but an ordinance is neces-
sary. 
\Y e admit our error in our petition in erroneously 
denominating the bond "'resolutions" of .Nfarch 17, 194 7 
and October 6, 193:2 as "ordinancs." At all mass meet-
ings and in all correspondence of the defendants it was 
stated that an "ordinance" would be eventually passed. 
We still believe that although the commission has desig-
nated these enactments "resolutions," they are in fact 
ordinances. As such they should have been adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 19-11-1, U.C.A., 
1943. Apparently the only reason they were not adopted 
as ordinances was that they would not have to be pub-
lished and so that they could be ordered to take effect 
immediately. This section has no emergency provision, 
similar to the clause in Section 15-6-12, U.C.A., 1943, 
applicable to municipalities~ 
The basis for this right of publication and the 
· limitations on the use of emergency enacting clauses 
has been the subject of many texts and decisions. 
~IcQuillan on Municipal Ordinances states: 
''The provision is in the nature of a limita-
tion upon the legislative and ministerial power. 
It is intended to enable the public to acquire 
knowledge of the ordinance before it shall become 
operative for any purpose. Where persons are 
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made.:liable, to. penal conse.quences·it is a hardship 
... ' .jf they .are not seasonably informed." -(Page 46). 
"Due notice of contemplated action upon the 
part of the municipal authorities is a wise and 
salutary rule, and is rigidly enforced by the 
courts as a fundamental constitutional right. Pro-
visions respecting publication and sufficient notice 
are generally held mandatory, and hence failure 
to publish in substantially the manner prescribed 
renders the ordinance or resolution void." (Page 
248). 
"The people are to be informed of the regu-
lations which are to govern them, and time as 
well as publication is material. The legislature 
wisely put stress both upon the mode of promul-
gation and upon the length of time to be allowed, 
and it would be wrong to abridge this time by 
construction." (Page 46) . 
In a recent case, Bonnie v. Smith, 147 P. 2nd 777, 
·the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled on this issue in 
connection with an ordinance establishing a sewer dis-
trict. There too the ordinance. contained an emergency 
clause and was not published. The court ruled that the 
ordinance was void and that the town was without 
jurisdiction to proceed : 
"Since the creation of these districts and the 
apportionment of the cost thereof to the proper-
ties affected is not an inherent power that can be 
exercised by municipalities in the absence of stat-
utory grants of such power must be explicit and . 
must be strictly construed, and must be strictly 
applied against the exercise of the power in any 
manner save in the 1nost literal sense within the 
meaning of the language of the statutes, Ameri-
can-First Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 169 Okl. 588, 
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38 P. 2d 957, we ·cannot overlook the failure to 
publish this ordinance on the theory it was an 
en1ergency ordinance." · 
Also the Supreme Court of Washington has frowned 
upon this unauthorized procedure in the case of Robb 
v. Tacoma, :2S P. (2nd) 327: 
"There is quite a difference between the is-
suance and enforcement of orders, generally, to 
abate a nuisance or to prevent the spread of a 
threatened epidenric, on the one hand, and on the 
other, an order compelling a city to install a 
Yast sewage system necessitating a bonded indebt-
edness of $3,000,000 . 
.. Furthern1ore, we do not think that an emer-
gency, as contemplated by the statute and our 
decisions, is presented by the pleading in this 
case. The condition complained of did not sud-
denly appear, but had been a recurring topic of 
discussion for a long time, as appears by the 
answer." 
The defendants' surreptitious enactment of these 
resolutions without publication was a delibe-rate attempt 
to circumvent limitations and restrictions imposed by 
the Legislature "for the purpose of protecting the com-
munity, the -people, from hasty, ill-conceived, fraudulent, 
or questionable ventures of officials serving short terms 
and who Inay wish to put over some pet scheme or "child" 
of their own. On important n1atters the people must not 
be left unadvised or their will ignored." 
Justice Larson in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo, 
74 P. 2nd 1191. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have gone to some lengths to convince the Court 
that construction and financing of a sewer system should 
not proceed under the present plan. 
We submit that there is justification for holding 
either that the Commission adopted the wrong statute, 
or that the statute adopted is unconstitutional, or that 
the defendants acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capri-
ciously, or that the bonding resolutions are illegal, void, 
and beyond the defendants' power. 
Accordingly, this court should enter a permanent 
writ of prohibition enjoining the Board of Salt Lake 
County Commissioners from the proceeding to acquire 
a sanitary sewer system under the name of Salt Lake 
City Suburban Sewer District. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
HERBERT F. SMART 
Attorneys for 
SALT LAKE CouNTY SuBURBAN 
IMPROVEMENT AssociATION 
Involwntary Party Plaintiff 
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